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Abstract 
 
Risk Management in Chinese banks has traditionally been the Cinderella of its 
internal functions. Political stricture and developmental imperative have often 
overridden standard practice of risk management resulting in large non-performing 
loan (NPL) ratios. One of the stated aims of opening up the Chinese banks to foreign 
strategic investment is the development of risk management functions. In recent years 
NPL ratios have declined through a mixture of recovery, asset management operation 
and expanded balance sheets. However, the training and practice of risk managers 
remain second class compared with foreign banks operating in China. This paper 
evaluates bank performance using a Network DEA approach where an index of risk 
management practice and an index of risk management organisation are used as 
intermediate inputs in the production process. The two indices are constructed from a 
survey of risk managers in domestic banks and foreign banks operating in China. The 
use of network DEA can aid the manager in identifying the stages of production that 
need attention.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years the Chinese banking system has made enormous strides in reform and 
deregulation. They have emerged relatively unscathed from the global banking 
epidemic that has infected the developed economies and the largest of them stand 
alongside the giants of global banking as first among equals1. However, despite the 
relative strength of the large listed Chinese banks in world banking, lingering doubts 
remain about the inherent fragility of the banking system in China. The past decade 
has seen a large volume of academic and professional papers expressing concerns 
about the safety and soundness of the Chinese banking system and their medium term 
viability in the face of increasing competition from foreign banks in the post WTO 
years. The common thread in many reviews of Chinese banking are; the large number 
of non-performing loans, the dominance of lending to state-owned enterprises, and the 
influence of local government and Communist Party officials in lending decisions.  
 A particular area of concern for the regulatory authorities and strategic 
investors in the Chinese banks has been the quality of training of risk managers, the 
organisational culture and the misalignment of incentives associated with bureaucracy 
rather than commercialism (Hamid and Tenev, 2008). The process of converting 
Chinese banks from state dominated bureaucracies to modern profit oriented banking 
institutions involves not just the training of decision makers in modern banking but 
also the transformation of the organisation. The transformation of the Chinese 
banking system has been occurring but on an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary 
scale. With the encouragement of the regulatory authorities, Chinese banks have in 
recent years, had to restructure their balance sheet, develop modern risk management 
                                                 
1 According to 1000 top bank survey in the July 2009 issue of the Bankers Magazine, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China is the 8th largest in the world and Bank of China is 11th largest. For a 
statement of the development of the banking market see Yang and Kuhn (2007) Ch 3. 
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methods, improve capitalization, diversify earnings, reduce costs and improve 
corporate governance and disclosure2.  
This paper aims to construct a metric of risk management practice, and risk 
management organisation in Chinese banks, using the foreign banks as benchmarks of 
best practice. The metric will measure how good the practice of risk management is in 
a Chinese bank and how well the risk management function organisation is relative to 
best practice. The metric can be used to rank banks not just on objective measures of 
performance but also on the often hidden measures of organisational practice which 
can be viewed as inputs to overall performance and may aid the manager to target 
specific areas for the purpose of improving performance and efficiency. Information 
on the individual banks’ risk management practice, organisation and training was 
obtained from interviews with risk managers and credit officers.  
The paper is organised in the following way. The next section outlines the 
results of interviews. Section 3 describes how the interview responses are converted 
into a relative score benchmarked on two of the major foreign banks operating in 
China (HSBC and Citibank). Section 4 describes the method of performance 
evaluation based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the use of network DEA 
to think of risk management and organisation as an intermediate output/input in the 
process. Section 5 summarises the results and concludes.    
 
2. Qualitative analysis 
Twenty four bank executives involved in the area of lending and risk management 
were interviewed over the period 2007-8. The banks included two foreign banks, the 
big 4, nine joint-stock commercial banks and two city commercial banks. The 
                                                 
2 CBRC Annual Report 2006 http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/index.jsp 
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interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format in which interviewee responses 
were recorded and respondents recorded their own scores (1 – 5 Likert scale) with 
respect to specific questions about risk management functions. Interviews were 
conducted in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Dalian, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The 
appendix details the banks that were involved in the study and the acronyms used in 
subsequent tables. 
The questionnaire was divided into three areas of the risk management 
operation. The first area was concerned with the importance of particular 
characteristics regarding the loan approval decision to specific sectors (large 
enterprises, SMEs and consumers). The second area covered the types of quantitative 
and qualitative tools used within the bank to aid the risk management process. The 
third area covered the organisation, training and staffing of the risk management 
section of the bank. This section dealt with issues relating to performance evaluation, 
training, recruitment, retention and work organisation. The appendix details the 
questionnaire and the mnemonics of the banks in the sample.  
Most interviews were conducted in an informal setting (lunch or tea) but on 
some occasions interviews were carried out in the interviewees office3. The principal 
aim of the interviews was to obtain a numerical score relating to the risk management 
function within the bank based on the value judgement of the interviewee. At the 
outset the interviewee was asked to provide some comments about the lending policy 
of the bank and to state the three main factors that determine loan approval. The 
responses varied from stating the PBOC guidelines for lending to State-Owned-
Enterprises (SOE) and Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), to stating key factors 
                                                 
3 The non-work environment for the conduct of the interviews turned out to be quite important. The 
respondent was a lot more relaxed and volunteered a wider perspective on the organisation of their 
respective bank. While none of the questions could be deemed to be politically or commercially 
sensitive, interviewees in the work environment responded cautiously to questions. For a discussion of  
the advantages and disadvantages of informal interviewing see Bewley (2002) 
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without elaboration.   The single largest factor in the granting of a loan was cash flow 
(70%), which biases bank lending to established enterprises. Record of repayments 
(good credit record) was cited by 30% of respondents. A preference for lending to 
SOEs (65%) reflects the political reality of state and local government relevance in 
the lending decision as well as implicit government guarantees. Collateral was not an 
issue except in the case of lending to SMEs. Less than 20% of interviewees 
considered collateral and guarantees as important in the lending decision reflecting the 
dominance of SOEs in the bank’s loan portfolio. Collateral was a more important 
feature for the two foreign banks reflecting the stronger focus of these banks in the 
SME sector. In the case of mortgage lending, there was no common formula like the 
product of a fixed parameter and annual income to determine loan size. The most 
common cited reason for approval of a mortgage was the type of job the borrower 
had. Government officials, civil servants and employees in large SOEs were viewed 
as having the safest jobs and lowest risk (65%). Income levels, ability to pay and 
volatility of income was cited as the second main factor in determining mortgage 
approval (25%). Loan-to-Value of mortgages does not exceed 80% and typically are 
in the region 60-65% with normal upper bound of 70%.   
The reasons for a loan refusal had a greater variation in the response. The 
single main reason for a loan refusal to a SOE was weak financials (36%) which was 
also linked to any history of delinquency (18%). However, the second single factor 
was state policy. Even if an enterprise is state owned, it may be classified as 
belonging to a declining industry with weak state guarantees (27%). In contrast, the 
foreign banks saw independence of SOE management from the state as a strength and 
cited management quality as the principal reason for loan refusal to a SOE.  
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In the case of SMEs, the principal reason for loan refusal was the lack of 
collateral or third party guarantee (36%). One responded stated that collateral 
substituted for post-loan monitoring and was viewed as the price for the loan. Weak 
financials and cash projections were the second most cited reason (27%) and poor 
credit record or lack of credit record was the third most cited reason (22%). The 
response of the domestic bank risk managers highlights the conservativeness of the 
lending decision to SMEs. Start up companies would be considered high risk and only 
established SMEs with good collateral and financial history stand much chance of a 
loan approval. The foreign banks also viewed start ups as risky but even with good 
financial projections and solid third party guarantees, the strength of the company’s 
management was a determining factor in loan refusal. Only one of the domestic 
bank’s respondents stated that the quality of management was a significant factor in 
loan refusal to SMEs.  
The policy on remuneration, incentives and performance evaluation varied 
widely. One of the big-4 had no formal performance related compensation system. 
Bonuses were determined by the Chief Risk Officer at HQ, but there was a 
recognition that risk managers that recovered NPLs were worthy of special reward. 
For this particular bank, the quantity or frequency of approvals was not a factor in 
determining the final bonus. Under-performance led to transfer. Except in cases of 
fraud, redundancy was not a policy option. With two other big-4 banks, profit from 
the loan was the principal factor in performance evaluation and NPL recovery was the 
next important factor. While the frequency or number of approvals did not affect the 
evaluation, the overall profit of the unit was the main factor. With one of these big-4 
banks, poor performance led to transfer or payment of basic salary (zero bonus). With 
the third bank in the big-4 group, the risk manager received 50% of compensation as 
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basic and 50% as bonus but the evaluation was done by the General Manager rather 
than an independent Risk Manager, giving rise to the potential of moral hazard.   
With the interviewees of the joint-stock banks (JSB), the frequency and size of 
approvals was cited as many times as the profitability of the loan book. Only one 
interviewee of a JSB mentioned moral hazard as a reason for separating the bonus 
package for risk staff from the approvals decision making process. But in contrast, 
one other interviewee of a JSB specifically stated that the principle of a separation 
between the Sales/Business side of bank operations and the risk management function 
is impractical. As each branch is its own P&L centre, the political and business 
pressure on the approvals process detracted from any attempt of independence. The 
local bank president had considerable influence over the local risk management team. 
A second interviewee of a JSB stated that the Sales /Business side of the bank was an 
important consideration for the determination of bonuses to risk management. A third 
interviewee said that the local bank president has considerable influence on the local 
risk management team although the governance structure is changing. In the case of 
one small city commercial bank the risk personnel were evaluated in exactly the same 
way as non-risk staff and the bonus was based on position rather than performance. 
Interviewees were asked to score the training of risk managers in their 
institution from a scale of [5] being excellent to [1] being useless. The benchmark 
score obtained from interviewing four managers from the two foreign banks was [5]. 
The median response from the Chinese bank managers was a score of [3] which was 
described as adequate with one-third of the sample scoring [2] as inadequate. Yet 
when asked to weight an incentive scheme against training to get the best performance 
from the risk team, the mean and median response was 60% in favour of incentives 
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and 40% for training. The benchmark defined by the interviewees of HSBC and 
Citibank weighted training as 70% and incentives 30%. 
The comparison may not be appropriate as it is widely believed that the 
foreign banks pay their risk staff more than the domestic banks and therefore can 
indulge in greater training than the domestic counterparts. While this perception is 
questionable4, the feeling that bonuses provide the appropriate compensation for risk 
staff is widely held and despite training only receiving a score of adequate, the general 
feeling was that marginally more resources should be targeted to creating stronger 
performance incentives. 
A similar question relating to staffing levels in the risk team where the 
benchmark response was a score of [4], which is described as ‘good’ but not excellent 
([5]) produced the following results. Three banks matched the benchmark and one 
exceeded it, but most recorded a score of [3] or [2]. The median score was [3]. There 
appeared to be no relationship between the perception of ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ and the 
position of the bank in the industry. The risk manager from the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, one of the largest in the world, gave a score of [2] 
(inadequate) for staffing levels in the RM field. In contrast four JSBs gave benchmark 
scores with the remaining big-4 SOB interviewees giving a score of [3]. 
The interviews also revealed information about recruitment and skills of bank 
personnel that were not covered in the questionnaire. One respondent of the big-4 said 
that ‘many heads of sub-branches are not professional bankers but are retired army 
officers of 10-15 years experience. They tend to be appointed to high levels even as 
President or Head of HRM and even on the credit committee. While the chief risk 
manager is usually a professional and can veto a lending decision, the non-
                                                 
4 It was learned in casual conversation that while basic pay of risk managers in domestic banks was 
lower than foreign banks, they often received higher end-of-year bonuses, soft loans and non-monetary 
benefits that were not available to those employed in foreign banks. 
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professionals wield influence and can affect decisions at the margin’. Another 
manager described his staff as principally ‘government officials’ that are procedurally 
driven rather than professional in the business of loan approvals. 
 
3.  Quantitative analysis 
This section describes the translation of the individual scores into a single relative 
metric. The questionnaire was divided into 3 main parts dealing with the lending 
decision (section 1), the tools and techniques employed in the risk management 
function (section 3), and the organisation, staffing, training, payment and retention of 
personnel engaged in the risk management function (section 4)5. In the first and third 
parts, the interviewee provided scores relating to individual factors. In the second part, 
the interviewee indicated the tools the bank employed in risk management and the 
interviewer entered a score based on a judgement of how close this was to the 
standard tools recognised as best practice6.  
 The benchmark responses and the median of the domestic banks responses for 
each part are shown in the radar charts 1 – 3 below. 
 Chart 1 plots the median responses against the benchmark for the 15 factors 
relating to the lending decision for SOEs, SMEs and consumers. It can be seen that in 
all but one case the benchmark scores dominate the median responses. This suggests 
that the domestic banks focus on factors that are different from what Western banks 
think as primary factors in the lending decision.  
Chart 2 shows the median scores and benchmark for 6 standard tools used in 
risk management. In order, these were RAROC or EVA in interest rate and fee 
                                                 
5 The questionnaire is presented in the appendix. 
6 For example if a respondent said the bank uses something similar to CreditmetricsTM and went on to 
describe the model, the interviewer would give a subjective score between [1] and [5] where [5] would 
be equivalent to the  CreditmetricsTM method.  
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pricing; credit scoring model (mortgages, credit card and consumer banking); credit 
committee for review of large scale loans; the calculation of a risk index based on 
balance sheet and income statements; the use of rating migration model or Value-at-
Risk; and finally stress testing exercises7.  
 
Chart 1: Lending Decision 
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7 As the interviewer, I made judgemental scores of tools that resembled the ones in the questionnaire. 
So for example if stress testing was in the form of scenario analysis and not in the context of VaR, a 
score of 4 was given rather than 5, or if knowledge of techniques were admitted to like KMV (distance-
to-default) but not implemented a score of 1 was not recorded. 
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Chart 2: Risk Management Practice 
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Chart 3 shows the median and benchmark scores for the 11 factors relating to 
the training, staffing, reward, recruitment, and retention of risk staff. The largest 
deviations from the benchmark were for training [X17] and external recruitment 
[X21]. The foreign banks have a stronger policy of external recruitment of risk staff 
whereas domestic banks have typically recruited from within the organisation. 
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Chart 3: Risk Management Organisation 
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 While charts 1 – 3 show the correspondence of the median score against the 
benchmark scores, a test for independence of the distribution of the scores from 
benchmark values is shown in table 1 below. We use two statistical tests for 
independence. The ‘t’ test is a small sample test but depends on the assumption of an 
asymptotic normal distribution. Since normality may not be an appropriate 
assumption, we employ a non-parametric test that is less restrictive in its assumption 
and only requires symmetry in the distribution. The Wilcoxon signed rank test, tests 
the median differences in paired data where one of the pairs is defined as the 
benchmark. Table 1 shows that except in the case of factor X3 (account profitability 
for SOEs)8 the two statistics agree at the common level of significance (5%). 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Both statistics were close to the critical values. The Wilcoxon test showed a significance level of 
5.9% and the ‘t’ statistic was only marginally larger than the critical value. 
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Table 1: Statistical significance of Individual Factors 
Individual Factor Wilcoxon* 
(p<.05) 
t(.05)*> 15.2
X1 – Credit Record (SOE .014* -3.67* 
X2 – Cash Flow (SOE) .022* -2.97* 
X3 – Account profitability (SOE) .059 -2.34* 
X4 – Collateral or Guarantee (SOE) .078 -1.91 
X5 – Know Your Customer (SOE) .006* -4.08* 
X6 – Credit Record (SME) .022* -3.06* 
X7 – Cash Flow (SME) .008* -3.38* 
X8 – account profitability (SME) .227 -1.75 
X9 – Collateral or Guarantee .008* -2.76* 
X10 – Know Your Customer (SME)  .022* -3.21* 
X11 – Credit Record (Mortgage) .036* -2.78* 
X12 – Personal Income (Consumer loan) .170 1.66 
X13 – Credit score (personal loans) .003* -5.7* 
X14 – Net worth of borrower (personal loan) .754 0.78 
X15 – deposit account (personal loan) .002* -5.66* 
X17 – Risk Management Training .001* -12.17* 
X18 – Staffing levels .002* -3.78* 
X19 – Organisation of workloads .036* -2.44* 
X20 – Internal Recruitment .177 0.95 
X21 – External Recruitment .001* -6.27* 
X22 – University background .286 0.95 
X23 – Foreign University Training .530 0.56 
X24 – Experience .100 -2.0 
X25 – Professional qualification .009* 3.24* 
X26 – Higher degree .038* 2.44* 
X27 – Retention Policy .834 -0.22 
 
The results of Table 1 suggest important differences in the attitudes of Chinese 
domestic bank risk managers and Chinese foreign bank risk managers. For domestic 
risk managers the credit record and cash flow of the borrower (SOE and SME) are 
less important than for foreign banks. Similarly knowing your customer is much more 
important to the foreign bank risk manager than the domestic. A possible reason is 
that domestic banks concentrate their lending on SOEs that are implicitly guaranteed 
by the central and local government and have less of a focus on SMEs. Therefore 
rules about credit record and cash flow or KYC were historically less relevant to 
them.  
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 A significant difference in importance of a person’s credit record and credit 
score for a mortgage loan (X11) indicates the prevalent attitude that the type of job a 
person has is a better indicator of creditworthiness than income. A frequent response 
was that a government official was considered a good risk and a credit score or credit 
record was inappropriate. 
 A strong difference was noted in the scoring of the risk management training 
(X17) provided in domestic banks. As chart 3 indicates, the median response was a 
score of [3] against a benchmark of [5]. Staffing levels were only adequate [3] or 
inadequate [2] against a benchmark of  good [4]. External recruitment was also an 
important difference in the preferences between RMs in domestic banks and foreign 
banks. Foreign banks were more used to using Head-Hunters and agencies to recruit 
from outside the bank whereas this was not typical of Chinese banks which had a 
preference for recruitment within the bank.  
Using the foreign bank scores as a measure of best practice the individual 5-
point Likert scores of the domestic risk managers were benchmarked. The 
benchmarking principle was that negative scores (when the individual score was less 
than the benchmark score) were heavily penalised but positive scores (individual 
score greater than benchmark) were lightly penalised. The argument is that negative 
scores are indicative of downside risk whereas positive scores are overcautious but do 
not warrant an equivalent penalty. For example if the benchmark is that a certain 
factor is ‘important’ (4) a score of ‘not important’ (3) is given a heavier penalty than a 
score of ‘very important’ (5). An asymmetric translation function on the lines of 
Surico (1998) produces the desirable properties. A translation function of the 
following type was used. 
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Where x = response score – benchmark score and γ is an arbitrary scaling parameter. 
The function described by equation (1) has the property of having a score of 100 when 
the respondents score equals the benchmark score but remains in the neighbourhood 
of 100 with a slight penalty for up to the value x = 2 (point of inflexion) when it starts 
to rise towards 100.  
Chart 4 illustrates. It shows that negative values of x are heavily penalised and 
positive values are lightly penalised. The purpose of this type of the translation 
function is to reward individual scores that weight specific factors greater than the 
benchmark but strongly penalise scores that are less than the benchmark. In reality no 
respondent exceeded the benchmark by more than 2 points on the score and it turns 
out that the translated score is not sensitive to the choice of the parameter γ.9   
The deviation of the different scores of each sub-section from the respective 
benchmark were first transformed by equation 1 and then combined using a principal 
components analysis (PCA) to construct a single metric for each bank10. The fifteen 
transformed scores relating to the approvals function (denoted risk) were subjected to 
the PCA and the first principal component11 was retained out of a possible five as a 
potential metric of risk for each bank. 
 
 
                                                 
9 The choice of the parameter influences the left side of figure 1 (negative deviations from benchmark) 
but has little effect on the right side (positive deviations). The continuity and monotonicity of the 
function ensures that the ranking remains consistent. 
10 It is important to note that most mathematical operations including PCA may not be valid for Likert 
scaled variables being ordinal rather than ratio-scaled. However, Ochieng Owuor and Zumbo (2001) 
show that in the context of regression models, a fewer number of Likert scale points result in larger 
biases and that four or more Likert scale points should be used. The data we use in the PCA has been 
differenced from the benchmark value and transformed by an asymmetric loss function. For a full 
discussion of the use of Likert scale variables in PCA see Kolenikov and Angeles (2009). 
11 Based on the Eigen vector of the largest Eigen value. 
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Chart 4: Relative Score Translation Function 
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The next step was to test the veracity of the principal component vector 
against an objective measure of risk. Following Hannan and Hanweck (1988), a risk 
index based on the probability of insolvency is defined as below; 
    
ROA
A
CAPROAE
σ
+)(
    (2) 
ROA is the return on assets, E(ROA) is the mean of ROA over the 5 years to 2007, 
CAP is the bank’s capital, A is its assets and ROAσ  is the standard deviation of ROA 
over the 5 years to 2007. Equation (2) is a risk index, measured in terms of units of 
the standard deviation of ROA. The index can be used to measures the probability of a 
decline in the bank’s accounting earnings so that it has a negative book value and 
measures the thickness of the capital cushion relative to profit so that a higher 
measure indicates a safer bank12.  The probability of insolvency can be obtained from 
                                                 
12 See for example Sinkey (2002) p. 140.  
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the reciprocal of the index squared. By Chebyshev’s inequality the probability of 
insolvency ρ   will be given by; 
   ( )[ ]2
2
2
1
/)( ACAPROAE
ROA
+≤
σρ    (3) 
However, in reality there have been no bank insolvencies in China that resulted in 
closure, in the post-communist era13. The index can be interpreted as a measure of the 
probability of technical insolvency and used as an indicator of the riskiness of the 
bank. For example the correlation between the risk index defined by equation (2) and 
the NPL ratio of the bank in 2007 is -.8860. A higher index score indicates a safer 
bank which correlates significantly with a lower NPL ratio. The risk index (denoted 
RI-07) was therefore used as a test of the veracity of the combination of the 15 factors 
shown in chart 3.  
Two combinations were compared. The simplest was the un-weighted average 
of the 15 factors (RISKMEAN) and the relatively sophisticated measure was the 
largest principal component of the 15 factors that arose out of a PCA (RISKPCA)14. 
While the correlation between the simple average (RISKMEAN) and the risk index 
(RI-07) was a mere 0.2877 and the correlation between RISKPCA and RI-07 was 
0.3753, the Spearman’s rank correlation was 0.0920 (p > | t |=.7420) and 0.6321 (p > | 
t |=.0115) respectively, suggesting that the largest principal component was a better 
indicator of risk practice in terms of the ranking of banks than the simple average. We 
use both indices in the empirical analysis but report the results using the RISKPCA 
measure below15. 
                                                 
13 In 2007 a number of weak city commercial banks were merged to form a single stronger bank. 
14 The correlation coefficient between RISKMEAN and RISKPCA was 0.5849 (p > .0220) and the 
Spearman’s rank correlation was 0.6357 (p > | t |=.0109).  
15 The quantitative risk tools were combined with the 15 risk factors but the correlations and rank 
correlations of the resulting simple average or the largest principal component from a PCA with the 
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 Similar to the construction of the risk management practice measure, two 
indices of risk management organisation were constructed from the transformed raw 
scores relating to training, staffing, recruitment and retention. The first was an 
unweighted average (ORGMEAN) of the transformed scores and the second was the 
first principal component of a PCA analysis (ORGPCA). The simple correlation 
between these two was 0.6579 and the Spearman’s rank correlation was 0.6005 (p > | t 
|=.0179). However, there was no significant correlation between either of the two 
measures and an objective measure of risk or bank performance such as cost-income 
ratio or ROA16.   
 
4. Network Data Envelopment Analysis 
In this section the measures of risk practice and organisational performance are 
treated as inputs in a multi-stage production process of the bank in a Data 
Envelopment (DEA) Analysis framework to transform primary inputs of operational 
expenses and fixed assets into the outputs of net-interest income and non-interest 
income. 
The traditional DEA method is a linear programming method for measuring 
the relative efficiency of DMUs that have multiple inputs and outputs. It is a 
technique that has been used as a benchmarking process in evaluating the efficiency 
of management to transform input resources into outputs relative to ‘best practice’. In 
the traditional DEA model, performance measurement is based on a ‘black box’ 
process (Färe and Grosskopf, 2000). Inputs are transformed into outputs but the 
transformation process is implicit and unknown. Indeed the advantage of DEA is that 
                                                                                                                                            
risk index suggested that there was little gain in including them and were subsequently excluded in the 
construction of an appropriate index. 
16 Both measures were used in the empirical analysis but only the results using the PCA are reported in 
the next section for reasons of brevity. The results from using both were qualitatively similar. 
  
19
19
it does not impose a specific structure. However, researchers impose some structure 
when applying DEA to specific problems. A common structure is the two-stage DEA.  
The two-stage method has been applied to numerous cases. For example in the case of 
a bank, labour and fixed capital can be used to generate deposits, which in turn is used 
to generate interest earning assets. The deposits can be viewed as an intermediate 
output which is an intermediate input to produce interest bearing assets in the second 
stage of production. Recent expositions can be found in Chen and Zhu (2004), Kao 
and Hwang (2008), Chen, Liang and Zhu (2009) and Cook, Liang and Zhu (2009).   
However, the two-stage DEA model is only one of a family of DEA models 
that comes under the notion of a network DEA framework. Färe and Grosskopf 
(2000) develop a general formulation of the network DEA which attempts to provide 
deeper structure to the ‘black box’ transformation of the conventional DEA. We 
construct a network DEA that utilises that risk and organisational indices we construct 
as intermediate inputs in the production process. 
Hua and Bian (2008) illustrate the case of a general network model with 
several separate production nodes including undesirable outputs. Assume that there 
are [n] DMUs and each DMU consists of [p] sub-DMUs (stages in production). Each 
sub-DMU transforms inputs into outputs producing external outputs [ ]*iy  (i=1,2,..p) 
and internal outputs [ ]iy~  that use external inputs [ ]ix  and internal inputs [ ]iyˆ .  
Denote ),...2,1,,.....2,1(),,...,(][ ,,,,2,,1, njpixxxx jiIjijiji === as the external 
input vector of the ith sub-DMU of the network DMUj. Let ]ˆ[ , jiy be the internal input 
vector of the ith sub-DMU which includes internal desirable inputs ]ˆ[ ,
d
jiy  and internal 
undesirable inputs ]ˆ[ ,
u
jiy . Let [ ]jiy ,~ be the internal output vector of the ith sub-DMU 
containing desirable outputs ]~[ ,
d
iiy  and undesirable outputs ]~[ ,
u
jiy . Let ][
*
, jiy  be 
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external output vector containing desirable outputs ][ *,
d
jiy  and undesirable 
outputs ][ *,
u
jiy . The data domain is defined as; 
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Where iiiiiii wv ηγωδμ ,,,,,, are respective multipliers. By the definition of the 
aggregate efficiency measure jn,θ above, the performance measure for the ith sub-
DMU of the network DMUj can be represented as; 
   u
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u
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A DMU is said to be efficient if its aggregate score is equal to unity. It can be shown 
that the aggregate performance measure jn,θ is a convex combination of all sub-
DMU’s performance measures ),....3,1(, piji =θ . This implies that the final efficiency 
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score of the network DMU will be an arithmetic weighted average of the sub-
DMUs17. 
The objective is to maximise the aggregate efficiency measure of a DMU0 
( 0,nθ ). Following Charnes and Cooper (1962) the non-linear programming problem 
becomes: 
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   (6) 
Solving (6) yields the score and all the input and output weights. By using the 
estimated weights, the efficiency scores of the sub-DMUs of the network DMU can 
be calculated. 
 Data Envelopment Analysis has been applied extensively in the banking 
literature and it is not purpose of this paper to review the literature. Traditionally, the 
application of DEA to banking has followed one of two methods. The most popular 
method is known as the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) which 
recognises the intermediation role of the bank by transforming the traditional factors 
of production such as labour and capital into outputs relating to stocks of earning 
assets. However, deposits and borrowed funds are seen as part of the intermediation 
process of taking in deposits and transforming them into loans. Consequently deposits 
are also classified as an input. The alternative method is the production approach that 
is closer to the neo-classical production function which uses the traditional factors of 
                                                 
17 In the absence of priors these are usually set to equal values. 
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production of capital and labour and uses these to produce the number of accounts of 
loan and deposit services. A proxy measure would be final output of the bank, namely 
its revenue streams (Drake, 2003). Between these two approaches have been a number 
of studies that have treated deposits as both inputs and outputs. Demand deposits are 
seen as an output as bank produce deposit related services to customers (billing, fund 
transfers, payments mechanism etc) while time deposits are maturity based and used 
as an input in the intermediation process. In a network framework, deposits can be 
seen as an intermediate output which is then used as an intermediate input in the 
production chain.  
To appreciate the value added from the risk and organisational indices 
constructed for the sample set of banks, we examine two cases of network DEA, 
excluding and including the risk practice index and risk organisation index as external 
an internal inputs in the intermediate stage of production. The first is a three-stage 
network DEA that excludes the risk practice index and risk organisation index in the 
intermediate stage, but as China has historically had a large non-performing loan 
(NPL) problem, taking the lead from Berger and De Young (1997) that NPLs will 
affect bank efficiency, we treat NPLs as a single separable bad output. The second 
case replicates the first case, where NPL is treated as a bad output, but including the 
measure of risk practice and risk organisation as internal and external intermediate 
inputs/outputs in the production chain18.  
Case 1 
The primary inputs are operational costs (OC), and fixed assets (FA). Personnel cost 
(PERS) and other operational costs (OTHER) are intermediate outputs in the first 
stage of production and intermediate inputs in the second stage of production of 
                                                 
18  The software DEA-Solver-PRO Version 6, www.saitech-inc.com was used. The non-oriented 
constant return to scale assumption is used in both cases. 
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interest costs (INTCOST) and branches (BR). Deposits (DEP) are treated as a primary 
input in the second stage of production. In combination with the primary and 
intermediate inputs in the second stage of production, non-interest earnings (NINT) 
are produced as a final output19. In stage three, INTCOST and BR are intermediate 
inputs to the production of interest earnings (INT). In addition, non-performing loans 
(NPL) are treated as an undesirable output by including it as a primary input in stage 
three20. The optimisation exercise is to maximise the desirable outputs and minimise 
the undesirable outputs within each sub-DMU21. 
Separating the stages of the creation of balance sheet items is more consistent 
with the intermediation approach. Operational costs and fixed assets are used to 
separate personnel costs from other costs. Deposits is a primary input but enters the 
production chain at a stage once the primary factor inputs of OC and FA have been 
deployed. The combination of personnel and other costs with deposits generate 
interest costs – the reward to depositors and the maintenance of the branch network. 
Non-interest earnings are generated as a final output at the second stage of production.  
Table 3 shows the results. The network results provide a wider menu of 
benchmark banks at each stage for the manager to emulate.  At stage 1, no bank is 
100% efficient but the big-4 can use CCB as the closest to ‘best practice’ and the 
other banks can learn from CMBCL and SPAN. A number of banks are 100% 
efficient at stage 2, but at stage 3 only CMBCL and SPAN are on the best practice 
frontier.  
 
                                                 
19 The implicit assumption is that fee income is largely generated in association with deposits which is 
dominated by households. In reality fee income will also be associated with corporate loans but to 
some extent this is captured by the creation of corporate deposits that match the marginal corporate 
loan account. 
20 This approximates the treatment of NPL as a separable bad output (Thanasoulis et al 2008).  
21 The optimisation procedure is shown in Hua and Bian (2008) 
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Table 3: Three Stage Network with NPL as Bad Output 
    Overall Overall Division1 Division1 Division2 Division2 Division3 Division3
No. DMU  Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
1 ICB 0.5481 4 0.4943 10 0.6292 8 0.5207 3
2 GDB 0.4123 6 0.5124 9 0.5912 10 0.1333 11
3 CMBCL 0.9505 1 0.8516 2 1 1 1 1
4 ABOC 0.2547 13 0.5528 7 1 1 0.0145 14
5 CCB 0.5653 2 0.7874 3 1 1 0.1985 7
6 CMB 0.0609 14 0.749 5 0.9309 5 0.0238 13
7 HUAXIA 0.0237 15 0.2254 15 0.3835 13 0.0064 15
8 EVERBRT 0.484 5 0.5167 8 0.7806 6 0.1548 10
9 ICBC 0.5497 3 0.6367 6 1 1 0.1898 8
10 BOC 0.3817 9 0.2978 13 0.6722 7 0.1751 9
11 SPD 0.3393 11 0.2947 14 0.4388 12 0.2845 4
12 SDB 0.3242 12 0.4244 11 0.4622 11 0.0859 12
13 SPAN 0.3859 8 0.9078 1 0.1725 14 1 1
14 BOB 0.3905 7 0.3078 12 0.6085 9 0.2282 6
15 CITIC 0.3446 10 0.7709 4 0.0084 15 0.2637 5
 Average 0.401027  0.555313  0.6452  0.28528  
 Std Dev 0.219209  0.221206  0.314219  0.317234  
 Coeff Var 0.546619  0.398345  0.487011  1.11201  
 
As a test of the veracity of the network DEA method, the overall score in 
Table 3 is compared with return on assets (ROA) as an accepted accounting-ratio 
measure of profit efficiency. A Spearman’s rank correlation of the score with ROA is 
.6643 (p > | t | = .0069)22. 
Case 2  
Table 4 below shows the implications of extending the network process to include our 
measures of risk practice and organisation in the production chain. This exercise 
utilises the measure of risk practice as a primary input in stage 3 and risk organisation 
as an intermediate output in stage 2 and an intermediate input in stage 3. As in case 1, 
in the first stage of the process, the primary inputs are used to produce PERS and 
OTHER. Deposits are a primary input in the first stage and NINT is a final output. In 
stage 2 INTCOST, BR and risk organisation (ORG) are intermediate outputs and 
                                                 
22 As a benchmark exercise, we used the score from a conventional ‘black box’ DEA with inputs OC, 
FA and DEP and outputs NINT and INT, under CRS, which was compared with ROA. The Spearman’s 
rank correlation is .4257 (p > | t | = .1136)  
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inputs to stage 3. The organisation of the risk management function acts as an 
intermediate input to the third stage of production in combination with branches and 
interest costs and the external input of risk management practice. The risk 
management practice measure is treated as an exogenous cultural input in the 
production of interest earnings in the final stage. It can be argued that different banks 
have different risk practice cultures that have evolved from their short history. State-
owned banks may have a different risk practice to joint-stock banks because of their 
history of directed lending to state-owned enterprises. City Commercial banks may 
have to deal with local government pressures that impinge on lending decisions and so 
on. Additionally non-performing loans are produced as a bad output in the final stage. 
Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration of the process. 
 
Table 4: Network DEA incorporating risk and organisational input measures 
    Overall Overall Division1 Division1 Division2 Division2 Division3 Division3
No. DMU  Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
1 ICB 0.7376 5 0.8483 4 0.5372 10 1 1
2 GDB 0.5241 10 0.5278 11 0.6033 9 0.4412 11
3 CMBCL 0.9493 4 0.8478 5 1 1 1 1
4 ABOC 0.5361 8 0.6415 9 0.6939 6 0.323 12
5 CCB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 CMB 0.1173 14 0.5949 10 0.6918 7 0.0572 14
7 HUAXIA 0.0356 15 0.2421 15 0.3993 13 0.0178 15
8 EVERBRT 0.6816 7 0.7026 8 0.6385 8 0.7281 9
9 ICBC 0.9535 3 0.8604 3 1 1 1 1
10 BOC 0.717 6 0.2869 14 0.9608 5 0.9034 6
11 SPD 0.4637 12 0.7772 7 0.2726 14 0.8516 7
12 SDB 0.4156 13 0.4486 13 0.4798 11 0.3182 13
13 SPAN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 BOB 0.4794 11 0.454 12 0.4787 12 0.506 10
15 CITIC 0.5309 9 0.8296 6 0.0096 15 0.7534 8
 Average 0.609447  0.67078  0.651033  0.659993  
 Std Dev 0.297394  0.240191  0.302253  0.355074  
 Coeff Var 0.487974  0.358077  0.464267  0.537997  
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Figure 3: Three-Stage Network DEA, NPL as bad output and risk practice as 
external input and risk organisation as internal input/output. 
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  Table 4 shows only two banks are 100% efficient overall, China Construction 
Bank and Shenzhen Ping An. However, ICBC and China Merchant are fully efficient 
in stages 2 and 3 and China Industrial is fully efficient at stage 3. It can be seen from 
Table 4 that the mean efficiency score is higher and the relative dispersion is lower at 
each stage of the production process. The inclusion of the risk management score as a 
primary input in the second stage of production has improved relative efficiency 
scores by pushing all of the banks on or closer to the frontier, but part of the reason 
for this is due to the dimensionality problem in linear programming.  
Pastor et al (2002) suggest a statistical test to evaluate the marginal role of an 
additional input (or output) in the production process as in a nested DEA model23. 
Since the DEA model applied in Table 3 is nested within the DEA model applied in 
Table 4, Pastor et al (2002) show that the ratio of the scores from the nested DEA to 
the full model represents the ‘efficiency contribution measure’ of additional inputs. 
We define a given marginal improvement in efficiency from the addition of the risk 
management practice and risk management organisation inputs as θ  and the actual 
efficiency gains as iθ~  for the i=1..15 banks. The marginal impact of the two risk 
indices can be evaluated as; 
   0]
~[ pp i >> θθ     (7) 
For a given probability 0p . The test is a conventional binomial where; 
   15,...2,1
..0
~.,...1 =
⎩⎨
⎧ >=Γ i
otherwise
if i
i
θθ  
Table 6 shows that evaluating the efficiency contribution at various levels of 
efficiency gain, the contribution of the risk indices lies in the region 20% - 25% at the 
conventional level of significance. 
                                                 
23 See also Pastor et al (1999) 
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Table 6: Efficiency Contribution Measure 
Tao Gain of 10% Gain of 20% Gain of 25% Gain of 26% 
1 14 13 12 10 
0 1 2 3 5 
p value .000977 .00739 .0352 .302 
 
A further indication of the value-added is obtained by comparing the overall score 
from Table 4 with ROA gives a Spearman’s rank correlation of .7080 (p > | t | = 
.0031). 
An alternative indication of the value-added of the use of the two measures in 
the production process can be gauged by using the overall efficiency score as an input 
in explaining bank profitability. The return on assets (ROA) is regressed on the NPL-
ratio and the efficiency score obtained from the two cases. As a benchmark for 
comparison we also use the score from a standard DEA with inputs OC, FA, and DEP 
and outputs NINT and INT under the CRS assumption. Table 7 shows the results. 
 
Table 7: Dependant variable ROA, ‘p’ values in parenthesis 
 Black box DEA Network DEA 
Case 1 
Network DEA 
Case 2 
Intercept 0.328 
(.197) 
0.704*** 
(.000) 
0.625*** 
(.000) 
NPL_RATIO -.037*** 
(.002) 
-.032*** 
(.005) 
-.035*** 
(.001) 
SCORE 0.911*** 
(.007) 
0.877*** 
(.003) 
.725*** 
(.000) 
2R  .6378 .6755 .7803 
σˆ  .2040 .1931 .1589 
F(2,12) 13.33 15.57 25.86 
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Clearly the results from Table 7 can only be interpreted as indicative. Since SCORE is 
constructed from operational costs and revenues of the banks it is an endogenous 
variable. However, as an indicator it is clear that the SCORE obtained from the 
inclusion of the risk practice and risk organisation functions of the bank explains 
ROA better in terms of R-square than the scores obtained in cases 1 and 2, which we 
argue is indicative of the information content in the use of the two scores in evaluating 
the relative efficiency of the banks in 2007. 
 
5.0  Conclusion   
We have constructed an index of relative risk management practice and risk 
organisational practice for a sample of Chinese banks. Risk management practice and 
risk organisational practice was confined to the classic retail bank functions. The 
indices were constructed using interviews from two foreign banks as benchmarks and 
consisted of scores provided by risk managers in domestic Chinese banks from 
responses to a semi-structured questionnaire. Scores on a Likert scale of 1-5 were 
translated into an index of practice from an asymmetric function that penalised 
downside deviations from best-practice more than up-side deviations. An aggregate 
score was constructed using principal components analysis. 
 The measures of risk management practice and risk management organisation 
obtained from questionnaire analysis could be used to rank the banks. However, 
organisation of the risk function is a management function and the risk management 
practice can be thought of as part of a culture of loan approval determined by a 
mixture of political as well as commercial interest. The organisation of the risk 
function measure can therefore be thought of as an internal intermediate input along 
with risk management practice as an external input, to produce interest earnings (as 
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well as non-performing loans). The risk organisation and risk management measures 
are a link in the production chain of revenue streams in Chinese banking.  
We found no significant direct relationship between the measures of risk 
management practice and risk management organisation and an objective measure of 
performance of the bank such as ROA. However, the input of these measures within a 
DEA network framework produced efficiency scores that explained ROA better than 
efficiency scores that excluded them. We argue that the information content of the 
risk management practice and risk management organisation measures is indirect and 
is better revealed within a network DEA framework 
The risk management practice and risk management organisational indices 
constructed from interviews provide insight into the risk function in Chinese banks 
relative to best practice. But, it is the combination of the risk practice and risk 
organisation with the other inputs and outputs of the banks that matter for final 
performance. Provided that the results from the interviews of risk managers for each 
bank are representative of broad practice nationwide, the indices can be used as inputs 
in the intermediate stage of production.  
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Appendix I 
 
Semi-structured Interview /  
 
1.  Principles of Loan Approval / 
1 Large enterprise / 
2 SMEs / 
3 Consumer loans – mortgages  –  
 
Large Enterprises / 
 
Three main factors that determine loan approval to large enterprises; 
 
a)  
b)  
c)  
 
Comments 
  
 
Large Enterprises / 
Scoring System 1 = not important, 5 = Very important  
 1~5 1=5 
 
Factor Scores  
 
Credit Record        [ ] 
Cash Flow        [      ] 
Account profitability (spread + fee income)  
+                                      [ ] 
Collateral/guarantee /      [ ] 
Knowing the customer             [       ] 
 
 
SMEs  
Factor Scores 
 
Credit Record        [  ] 
Cash Flow        [ ] 
Account profitability (spread + fee income)  
+                                                                      [ ] 
Collateral/guarantee /      [ ] 
Knowing the customer      [ ] 
 
 
 
Consumer Loans / 
Mortgages   
Credit Record        [ ] 
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Income                  [ ] 
Credit Score /     [  ] 
Net worth        [  ] 
Deposit account with bank       [     ] 
  
  
Comments  
 
 
 
2.  Main reason for non-approval of loans /  
 
SOE / 
. 
 
SME /  
 
 
Private Companies /  
 
 
Mortgages /  
 
 
3. Loan pricing. How is interest rate used as leverage? 
 
 
Cost of funds + overheads + risk?  +  + 
 
Comments  
 
 
4. What risk management tools are used in bank operations? 
 
Examples: 
  a) RAROC / 
  b) Credit scoring models /  
 c) Credit committee /  
 d) Risk index /  
e) Credit metrics – rating migration models /  – 
 
 f) Stress-testing 
 
 
Comments  
 
 
 
5. Incentives, Compensation, Staffing, Training, Recruitment and Retention 
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a) Incentives/Compensation – how is compensation of the risk management team 
determined? / –  
 
 
b) Performance evaluation  
 
 
c) Training  
Training of risk managers – [5] Excellent, [4] Good, [3] Adequate, [2] Inadequate, [1] 
Useless.  
 - [5] , [4] , [3] , [2] , [1] .  
 
Score           [ ] 
 
d) Staffing levels  
Risk staff                   [ ] 
 
e) Organisation 
Organisation of work flow/through-put  
 
Where [5] Optimal, [4] Good but no slack or flexibility, [3] Adequate but slippage 
and deadlines frequently not met, [2] Inadequate to meet flow of work, [1] No Team 
to speak off. 
 [5] , [4] , [3] , [2] 
, [1] . 
 
Score          [ ] 
 
f) Recruitment  
 
Internal recruitment  Score     [     ] 
External recruitment       [    ] 
University training       [     ]  
Foreign university background     [     ] 
Experience          [     ] 
Professional qualification /    [     ]  
Higher degree        [     ]  
 
g) Retention  
Score: Performance of the Bank in retaining key staff [5] Excellent, [4] Good, [3] 
Fair, [2] Bad, [1] No policy.   
[5] , [4] , [3] , [2] , [1] .   
Score              [ ] 
 
 
Comments  
 
 
6. Auditing of loan portfolio  
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How is auditing of loan portfolio done? How frequent? 
  
 
7.    Loan Portfolio 
  
 
 Exclusions  
What industries are excluded from loans?  
 
Which sectors are excluded from loans?  
  
 
 
7. Weighting of Incentives versus training  (%) 
 
In evaluating the role of incentives and training in improving management 
performance.  
 
 
Incentives         [ ] 
Training         [ ] 
Sum         [100% ] 
 
 
Appendix II 
 
Bank Number Mnemonic Bank Name 
1 ICB Industrial Bank of China 
2 GDB Guangdong Development Bank 
3 CMBCL China Merchant Bank Co Ltd 
4 ABOC Agricultural Bank of China 
5 CCB China Construction Bank 
6 CMB China Minsheng Bank 
7 HUAXIA Huaxia Bank 
8 EVERBRT Everbright Bank of China 
9 ICBC Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
10 BOC Bank of China 
11 SPD Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
12 SDB Shenzhen Development Bank 
13 SPAN Shenzhen Ping An Bank 
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14 BOB Bank of Beijing 
15 CITIC China CITIC Bank 
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